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PAUL S. WEILAND* & ROBERT 0. VOS**

Reforming EPA's Organizational
Structure: Establishing an Adaptable
Agency through Eco-Regions
ABSTRACT

Numerous scholars and practitionershave calledfor major reform
of the environmental laws implemented by the Environmental
ProtectionAgency (EPA). But less attention has been paid to the
organization of EPA itself. Assessment of EPA's organizational
structureis both timely and important. Based on an assessmentof

the ecological and politicalcontext within which EPA operates, we
contend that the agency should be organizedin a less programmatic
and more adaptable manner. Specifically, we propose the
realignmentof EPA's regionaloffices on an eco-regional basis. An

eco-regionbasedorganizationalstructurehas many advantagesover
the currentstructureof the agency and may assistEPA in efforts to
address the dynamic challenges it faces now and in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most prominent federal agencies responsible for

shaping the nation's environmental policy and implementing its
environmental laws is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Although EPA is often thought of solely as a pollution control agency, it
addresses a broad array of environmental issues including land use and
natural resources management.' EPA is charged with enforcing laws that

* Attorney, Policy, Legislation, and Special Litigation Section, Environment and Natural
Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice. J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., Indiana
University; B.A., University of Southern California.
** Research Associate, Sustainable Cities Program, University of Southern California.
Ph.D., University of Southern California; B.A., University of Southern California.
*** The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of any organizations with which the authors are affiliated. Earlier versions of this article were
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco,
March 8-12,1992, and the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Public Administration,
Newark, March 10-13, 2001. Thanks to Dan Fiorino for comments on the article.
1. For example, EPA reviews Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) prepared
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4345 (1994); EPA shares
responsibility with the Army Corps of Engineers for implementation of federal wetlands law
(i.e., Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994)); and EPA is now shaping
federal brownfields policy. Other executive branch organizations ranging from the Department
of Interior to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission address vital, but more narrowly focused,
environmental matters.
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involve the agency in matters at the local, state, national, and international
levels on a routine basis. EPA also plays an important role in emerging
matters at the nexus of environment and society such as environmental
justice and smart growth.' The broad reach of EPA distinguishes it from
similar independent federal regulatory agencies (e.g., the Food and Drug
Administration) and, makes it an important candidate for innovative
organizational approaches.
Numerous scholars and practitioners have called for major reform
of the environmental laws implemented by EPA.3 Less attention has been
paid to the organization of EPA itself.4 The proposal to make EPA a cabinetlevel agency (a symbolic rather than substantive change to the agency) is
the only change to the organizational structure of EPA that has received
significant attention.5 We contend that it is both timely and important to
assess EPA's organizational structure. Indeed, priorities for legal change
may flow more readily from a reorganization of EPA itself.
Part II identifies the agency's mission. Parts III and IV respectively
consider the ecological and political context within which EPA operates. A
typology of organizational structures is provided in Part V. EPA's
operational context dictates the need for an organizational structure that is
adaptable and structured around eco-regions. Part VI provides a vision for

2. See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering
Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance
for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised
Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27,2000); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SMART
GROWTH STRATEGIES FOR NEW ENGLAND (1999). The role of EPA expands further into the
mounting extinction crisis as the pressures of sprawl and pollution degrade habitats around

the country.
3. See, e.g., TOWARDSUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Daniel A. Mazmanian & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1999); MICHAEL S.
GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW (1996); NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB.
ADMIN., SETTING PRIORIES, GETTING RESuLTS (1995); DEWITJOHN, CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM
(1994); Robert W. Hahn, Toward a New EnvironmentalParadigm,102 YALE L.J. 1719 (1993); Scd.
ADVISORY BD., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990) [hereinafter Sd. ADVISORY BD.]; ROBERT N. STAVINS ETAL.,
PROJECT 88: HARNESSING MARKET FORCES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT (1988); Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985); R.
SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983). The
literature cited represents a range of perspectives on the need for reform.
4. For recent exceptions, see NATL ACAD. OF PuB. ADMIN., ENVIRONMENT.GOV:
TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000); NAT'L ACAD. OF
PuB. ADMIN., LEARNING FROM INNOVATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2000).
5. See DANiELJ. FIORiNO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 42-43 (1995); Paul S. Weiland
et al., The Evolution, Operation,-and Future of Environmental Policy in the United States, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POuCY INTHE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 97, 102
(Randall Baker ed., 1997).
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the direction in which we contend the organizational structure of EPA
should shift.
II. EPA'S MISSION
Before considering EPA's organizational structure, it is useful to
establish a benchmark for evaluation.6 When Congress and the President
created EPA and its primary enabling legislation in 1970, the mission of the

agency seemed to most people to be clear and simple.7 To many people
(including lawmakers), environmental problems appeared to be discrete

issues with scientific solutions. The mission of the agency was therefore to

set scientific (i.e., objective) standards and use its legal authority to penalize
polluters.' EPA was created as an independent regulatory agency to
accomplish this mission. Program offices were established for a number of
the major federal environmental laws (created partly from the remnants of

6. The mission of the agency does not provide the only possible benchmark. Marc K.
Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R.Thomas judge EPA by four criteria: fidelity to the
technical merits, promoting civic education, responsiveness to the public, and building
institutional capacity. MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THEWRONG QUESTIONS 6-9 (1990). Others have evaluated EPA based on data designed
to track actual improvement in environmental quality (e.g., lessening of air pollution in
metropolitan areas). See, e.g., PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul R.
Portney ed., 1990). The author of a more recent study chose to evaluate EPA on the basis of its
record in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See JONATHAN ADLER,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ON THE BENCH: THE EPA'S RECORD IN FEDERAL COURT (2000).
7. One account of the history of EPA describes the mission of William Ruckelshaus,
EPA's first Administrator, as follows: "Ruckelshaus's original mission appeared simple
enough: clean up America." DENNIS C. WILLIAMS, THE GUARDIAN: EPA'S FORMATIVE YEARS,
1970-1973, at 1 (1993), availableat http: //www.epa.gov/history/publications/formative.htm.
Accord Odelia Funke, Struggling with Integrated Environmental Policy: The EPA Experience, 12
POL'Y STUD. REV. 137,137 (1993) ("In its early years, EPA was busy trying to address imminent
environmental threats-burning rivers and belching stacks signaled clear and immediate
problems."); Daniel J. Fiorino, Can Problems Shape Priorities? The Case of Risk-Based
EnvironmentalPlanning,50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 82,82 (1990) ("When the national environmental
program emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the problems for the most part were visible
and their causes identifiable... .Solving these problems appeared to be a matter of harnessing
the political will and legal muscle to set action-forcing technological standards and to crack
down on polluters that failed to meet them.").
8. In the words of President Nixon, "EPA would be charged with protecting the
environment by abating pollution." Environmental Reorganization Plan of July 9, 1970,
reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 118-A, 119-A-120-A (1970). Evidence that
Congress shared this sentiment may be inferred from the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean
Water Act of 1972. "The EPA was required to achieve specific air and water quality goals
within a fixed-and short-period of time. The 1970 Clean Air Act required that EPA achieve
healthy air by 1975, and the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) required that
EPA eliminate discharges into the nation's waterways by 1985." Alfred Marcus, Environmental
ProtectionAgency, in THE POLTCS OF REGULATION 267, 267-68 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
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offices started in other departments) and arrayed around the Office of the
General Counsel (OGC).9
The complexity and interconnectedness of environmental problems
have become increasingly apparent over time. "Objective" scientists are
often unable to specify data and solutions with a high level of certainty.
Cumulative impacts of multiple pollutants from multiple sources are
difficult and costly to evaluate. EPA's regulatory purview encompasses
many actors and realms of government policymaking.10 Moreover, political
and legal boundaries established by humans often do not correspond with
ecological realities." In short, environmental problems are not discrete and
their solutions cannot be defined objectively.
Various alternative descriptions of EPA's mission have emerged
since the formation of the agency in 1970. For example, a mission statement
adopted by EPA in 1994 states in part:
[W]e work with our partners to protect human health,
ecosystems, and the beauty of our environment using the best
available science. We value and promote innovative and
effective solutions to environmental problems. We strive to
protect and sustain the productivity of the natural resources
on which all life and human activity depend."
Here the agency recognizes that its primary purpose is not just to enforce
the law, but also to help state and local partners solve the nation's
environmental problems using the "best available science."13
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
alternatively sees priority setting through risk assessment as the key
element of EPA's mission.14 The NAPA mission statement is based upon

9. William Ruckleshaus, EPA's first Administrator, was an attorney who used litigation
to achieve high-profile enforcement action. Many subsequent EPA Administrators also have
been attorneys.
10. Theodore Lowi writes that "[t]he whole universe is covered by the EPA's jurisdiction."
THEODORE J. LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 120

(2d ed. 1979).
11. The struggle to define wetlands subject to federal jurisdiction under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) provides an instructive example of the disjuncture
between boundaries established by humankind and environmental problems. This matter is
addressed in section I.A., infra.
12.

U.S. ENVTL. PROT.AGENCY, THE NEw GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:

A SUMMARY OF EPA'S FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN (1994).

13. Id.
14. NAPA devised the following mission statement:
The mission of the Environmental Protection Agency is to provide national
leadership in setting goals and priorities for environmental protection. The
agency sets national standards for environmental protection and undertakes
a variety of activities to ensure that the standards are met. To that end, EPA
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recognition that finite resources will be expended upon efforts to protect the
environment. The authors of the statement thus emphasize risk assessment
as a tool that might allow the agency to allocate those resources most
effectively. Additionally, this mission statement emphasizes the importance
of intergovernmental cooperation as a mechanism to achieve environmental
protection.
EPA's most recent mission statement is notably different from
earlier mission statements because it is a complex mixture of goals. The
basic statement is simple enough, "the mission of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency is to protect human health and to safeguard the natural
environment-air, water, and land-upon which life depends." 5 Yet it also
lists purposes such as enforcing the nation's environmental laws,
considering impacts on other policy areas (e.g., international trade),
providing environmental information for the public, developing a
sustainable economy, and even acknowledging the importance of U.S.
leadership in reaching major global accords.16 EPA's most recent mission
statement also reinforces the notion of risk assessment. It recognizes the
limits of science and the central role of science in environmental policy.
Finally, it recognizes the nexus that exists between environment and
society.
EPA's fundamental mission is to protect and enhance human health
and environmental quality,17 yet the wide scope and subjective nature of
this mission make it difficult to accomplish. Increasingly, the same
regulation designed to preserve the right to a clean environment tends to
infringe upon other rights enjoyed by the public.' It is EPA's challenge to
determine the appropriate level of regulation while maintaining this
delicate balance of rights. The agency's task is to remediate existing
pollution; maintain a clean environment; and, where possible, enhance
environmental quality all without causing severe economic dislocation or
a political backlash against major federal environmental laws.

builds knowledge about opportunities to reduce risks to human health and
the environment, enforces some standards and oversees state enforcement of
national standards, and assists states and communities in designing and
implementing their environmental protection strategies.
NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 11.
15. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Doc. No. EPA/190-R-97-002, EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 16

(1997), availableat www.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/epastrat.pdf.
16. See id.
17.

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Doc. No. EPA/190-R-00-002, STRATEGIC PLAN 2(2000),

availableat http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/2000strategicpan.pdf
18. For example, air pollution control regulations may curtail or increase the costs
associated with automobile usage.
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Although it sometimes lies dormant, broad public support exists for
environmental protection.19 These views are an important reservoir of
bureaucratic power for the agency.20 Thus, maintaining and enhancing
public support is an essential component of the agency's mission. Garnering
public support requires EPA to assess environmental values accurately
when creating policies that balance the vital interests and aspirations of the
public.
III. ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Before devising any proposal to alter the organizational structure
of EPA, it is necessary to understand attributes of the natural environment.
Such attributes distinguish environmental protection from other regulatory
milieus in important ways.
A. Boundaries
One key attribute associated with environmental problems is the
fact that they cross human boundaries. Cooperation is often necessary to
address environmental problems. In legal terms, cross boundary problems
are related to jurisdiction." The jurisdiction of all units of government is
limited at least with respect to geographic area. For example, boundaries
demarcate the geographic authority of state governments.' Thus, New York
solid waste disposal laws do not apply to disposal facilities located in
Indiana.

19. See generallyLydia Saad & Riley E. Dunlap, Americans Are Environmentally Friendly,
but Issue not Seen as Urgent Problem,at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000417.asp
(Apr. 17, 2000); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECIsIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 3 (1999); WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITCS AND PoucY 41-43 (4th ed. 1998),
20. See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: POLICY-MAKING INTHE
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 57-61 (3d ed. 1993); FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY,
POLITICS, AND PuBuC POLICY 50 (3d ed. 1984).

21. "Jurisdiction" is a "government's general power to exercise authority over all persons
and things within its territory." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed.

1999).
22. This statement is generally true; however, there are instances in which the jurisdiction
of a state may extend beyond its borders. Jurisdiction is a complex area of legal doctrine. For
an excellent summary of jurisdiction of the federal government, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION (3d ed.1999).
23. While accurate, this statement is complicated by the facts that (1) solid waste

generated in New York may be transported to Indiana for disposal and (2) solid waste
generated within New York still may be subject to New York law. Although each state
manages facilities and resources within its own jurisdiction, other states may enact laws that
affect those facilities or resources.
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The jurisdiction of all governmental units in the United States is
also limited with respect to subject matter. For example, the doctrine of
preemption limits the subject matter over which states have authority.' The
source of federal preemption is the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."
Congress and the courts have invoked the doctrine of federal preemption
to limit the ability of states to regulate in a wide variety of areas of
environmental concern including automobile emission standards,26
hazardous waste management, nuclear waste management, 8 oil pollution
prevention,2 9 and pesticide labeling.'
In economic terms, cross boundary problems are referred to as
externalities.3 A negative externality exists when an agent does not bear all
of the costs associated with the agent's action. 2 For instance, if Facility A is
located on a river upstream from Facility B and Facility A releases effluent
into the river, this action may result in no adverse consequences for Facility
A although it does have adverse consequences for Facility B.At least some
of the costs associated with Facility A's action are externalized; that is, they
are not borne by Facility A but are imposed upon Facility B.
Negative externalities may differ significantly in kind and degree.
In contrast to the relatively simple example described above, consider the
management of a species that migrates through habitat that includes
portions of states W, X, Y, and Z. If State W does damage to the habitat, all
four of the states may suffer adverse consequences (e.g., the extinction of the
species). In fact, the extinction of the species may have adverse
consequences beyond the boundaries of its habitat. Thus, some portion of

24. For an explanation, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1172212 (3d ed. 2000).
25. The Supremacy Clause has a preemptive effect only when coupled with another clause
in the Constitution that permits federal government action.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (1994). See also Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm'r, Mass.
Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000).
27. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88 (1992); Ensco, Inc. v.
Dumas, 807 F. 2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
28. See generally Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d
Cir. 1985).
29. See generally U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
30. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).

31. The extent to which negative externalities exist, the causes of such externalities, and
possible solutions are the subject of a vast literature. See, e.g. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
InterstateEnvironmentalExternalities,144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
EnvironmentalFederalism,95 MIC. L. REV. 570 (1996).
32. See ToMTIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTALAND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 51-52 (3d
ed. 1992); DAVID L. WEIMER&AtDANR. VINING, POUCYANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 5758 (2d ed. 1992).
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the costs associated with State W's action is externalized. 33 Many pollution
control and resource management problems may be conceptualized as
externalities.
Human boundaries confound efforts to manage humanenvironment relations. To overcome the problems associated with such
boundaries, it is necessary for people and institutions to cooperate.
Cooperation to protect or enhance the natural world is only possible after
parties have agreed that cooperation is necessary and specified the nature
and extent of such cooperation. This agreement may be elusive due to value
differences and scientific uncertainty.
B. Scientific Uncertainty
Although the twentieth century brought important new
understandings in medical science and the ecosystem concept, gaps in
human knowledge of the natural world are still extensive.' Furthermore,
new empirical data continue to contradict fundamental theories and
assumptions upon which we base much of our understanding of the natural
world and our relationship to it. Scientific uncertainty is thus another key
attribute associated with environmental problems.
Scientific uncertainty manifests itself in a number of different ways.
First, human knowledge of biotic nature is incomplete. Humankind lacks
the raw data necessary to begin to comprehend the biological fabric of our
planet. For example, estimates of the total number of species on the planet
vary 3.6 million to 111.7 million.3' By comparison, the number of known
species is estimated tobe 1.5 million.' New species continue tobe identified

33. This example may also be conceptualized as a public goods problem. "Public goods
are defined as those which exhibit consumption indivisibilities and are fully accessible to all."
TIETENBERG , supra note 32, at 56. Whereas negative externalities are over produced, public
goods are over consumed. Negative externalities and public goods can be thought of as two
sides of the same coin. For example, in an unregulated market, if factories produce emissions
that deteriorate air quality, the emissions are described as negative externalities and the clean
air is described as a public good. The emissions are over-produced and the clean air is overconsumed.
34. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: EPA NEEDS BETTER
INFORMATION TO MANAGE RISKS AND MEASURE RESULTS 3 (2000) (stating that "very little is
known about the risks of potential exposures to chemicals and environmental conditions for
workers, the general public, and plant and animal life"); FRANK BENJAMIN GOLLEY, A HISTORY
OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT IN ECOLOGY: MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS 1-66 (1993) (tracing
the historical development of the ecosystem concept).
35. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE xiv (1999). Wilson points out that the
species concept has itself been subject to revision. See id. at xii-xiii.
36. See id.
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at a rate of 13,000 per yearY At the same time, it is estimated that species
are becoming extinct at a rate of between 1 and 10 percent per decade.'
Likewise, understanding of the ecological and human health risks
associated with synthetic chemicals accumulating in the environment is
woeful. For nearly all of these chemicals we lack key information about
pathways of exposure, potential interactivity with existing chemicals, and
the dose received by different members of the human population. Without
these data, we cannot accurately estimate risk, and without accurate
estimates, it is impossible to determine the extent to which regulation is
necessary to protect human health and the environment. 9
Scientific uncertainty also manifests itself through incomplete
understanding of natural processes. For example, until relatively recently,
a prominent concept both among ecologists and lawmakers was the notion
of a balance of nature. This notion, which posits the proposition that the
natural world is in a state of dynamic equilibrium, is the basis for many
laws enacted and policies adopted. It has been thoroughly discredited. 40
A final way in which scientific uncertainty becomes manifest is
through humankind's inability to understand the implications of its own
technologies, even those designed for greater safety or a cleaner
environment. It is often the case that the adverse environmental
consequences associated with human actions are unforeseen.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), for example, are synthetic chemicals first
created in 1928 by DuPont and General Motors.41 These seemingly benign
and stable chemicals were used for decades as refrigerants, fire retardants,
and blowing agents. By the mid-1970s, scientists were beginning to suspect
that CFCs might have adverse impacts on the Earth's stratospheric ozone
layer, and by the late 1980s the international community had achieved

37. See id. at xiii.
38. See id. at xviii.
39. David Roe & William S. Pease, Toxic Ignorance, ENVTL. F., May/June 1998, at 24,24
(stating that "[flor nearly all of the important industrial chemicals in U.S. commerce,
government lacks the basic information needed to calculate the degree of danger-or lack of
danger-that a chemical poses when it is used").
40. Regarding the demise of the balance of nature, see generally DANIEL BOTKIN,
DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT CENTURY (1990); A. Dan

Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigmin Ecology and the PartialUnravelingof EnvironmentalLaw,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (1996).
41. See Edward A. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH:
SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27, 28 (Peter M. Haas et
al. eds., 1993).
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sufficient consensus regarding the devastating effects of CFCs to begin the
phase out of CFC production and consumption.42
Use of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) as an oxygenate in
gasoline provides another example of the unintended and unforeseen
consequences associated with human actions. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 required the use of reformulated gasoline (RFG) in
nonattainment areas (i.e., areas of the United States that are in violation of
the standards identified in the Clean Air Act and associated regulations) in
order to improve air quality.43 RFG must contain a specified percentage of
oxygen, and MTBE is one of two oxygenates used to meet this
requirement." The use of RFG has resulted in a significant reduction in air
pollution in nonattainment areas.45
MTBE is a volatile organic compound composed of small molecules
that are soluble in water.' As a result, MTBE in gasoline that spills or leaks
from tanks moves into groundwater more rapidly than other gasoline
constituents.47 The health effects of MTBE consumption in drinking water
are unclear, but studies completed after MTBE was released into the
environment indicate potential carcinogenic characteristics.' Beginning in
1992, the use of MBTE in gasoline increased significantly. By the late 1990s,
concern about groundwater contamination caused by MBTE increased
dramatically.49
MTBE is a particularly important case of scientific uncertainty
because it illustrates the problem of cross-media pollution, a problem only
exacerbated by the current structure of EPA. Use of MTBE to address air

42. See RIcHARDELLIOT BENEDIcKOZONEDIPLOMACY:NEWDIRECTIONSIN SAFEGUARDING
THE PLANET 10-11, 68-97 (enlarged ed. 1998); Owen Greene, The System for Implementation

Review in the Ozone Regime, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMiTMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 89 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).

43. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994).
44.

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA-822-F-97-009, FACTSHEET, DRINKING WATER

ADVISORY: CONSUMER ACCEPTABILITY ADVICE AND HEALTH EFFECTS ANALYSIS ON METHYL

TERTIARY-BUTYL ETHER (MTBE) 1 (Dec. 1997).
45.

See id.

46. See id.
47. See id. MTBE also becomes a problem in lakes with recreational boats and jet skis, since
it is one of the constituents that leak from notoriously inefficient two-stroke boat engines.
48. See Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, MTBE: Can the Controversy Be Contained?,14
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 603,604 (1999).
49. By the late 1990s, a number of states were taking steps to limit MTBE. For example,
on March 25,1999, Governor Gray Davis of California announced that he was phasing out the
use of MTBE in gasoline in the state, and on May 24, 2000, Governor George Pataki of New
York signed a bill that will prohibit the sale or use of MTBE beginning January 1, 2004. See
Governor Orders Phaseoutof MTBE, Seeks Waiver of Air Act Fuel Mandate, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2382, 2382 (Apr. 2, 1999); Governor Signs Acid Rain Controls, Ban on MTBE Use as Gasoline
Additive, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1180, 1180 (June 2,2000).
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pollution caused new water pollution problems. Air pollution regulators
who made the key decisions surrounding the introduction of MTBE did not
have adequate animal studies to assess the risks of drinking and swimming
water contamination.' They also failed to communicate with other

regulators about the problem of leaking underground storage tanks or
understand the special geological significance of MTBE's solubility as a
pathway into groundwater.'
The degree of scientific uncertainty that exists may seem
overwhelming because society engages in so many activities that affect the
natural world in so many different ways. 2 Furthermore, the tools devised
to integrate scientific knowledge into environmental law and policy remain
crude. As a result, there is often a lag between emerging scientific
knowledge and the application of that knowledge through environmental
law and policy. For example, except for acute toxicity, risk assessment
retains an almost singular focus upon the carcinogenic effects associated
with environmental contaminants.53

50. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOC. No. EPA/600/R93/206, ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL HEALTH RISKS OF GASOLINE OXYGENATED WITH METHYL
TERTIARY BUTYL ETHER (MTBE) (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/mtbe/
gasmtbe.pdf
51. The University of California Blue Ribbon Commission issued an extensive report to
Governor Gray Davis on health and environmental assessment of MTBE. See generally UNIV.
OF CALIFORNIA, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF MTBE (1998), available at
http://www.tsrtp.ucdavis.edu/mtberpt/Homepage.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
52. Human knowledge of the effects of individual chemicals that have been thoroughly
studied for decades is continually subject to revision. For example, recently EPA completed a
reassessment of dioxin exposure on human health. See generally OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV.,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INFORMATION SHEET 1: DIOXIN: SUMMARY OF DiOXIN REASSESSMENT
SCIENCE (June 2000); OFFICEOF RESEARCH&DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Information Sheet
2: Dioxin: Scientific Highlights from Draft Reassessment (June 2000). The Health Effects
Institute recently completed a study of particulate matter less than 10 mm in diameter (PM10)
that suggests a link between exposure to PM10 and mortality rates. See JONATHAN M. SAMET
ET AL., THE NATIONAL MORBIDITY, MORTALITY, AND AIR POLLUTION STUDY PART 11: MORBIDITY,
MORTALITY, AND AIR POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2000). The cumulative effects of
multiple chemicals are generally beyond our understanding. The study of such impacts is a
relatively recent phenomenon. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997).
53. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 6 (1993) (stating that cancer is "the engine that drives much of health risk
regulation"); John S. Applegate & Celia Campbell-Mohn, Risk Assessment: Science, Law and
Policy, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 219,220 (2000); see also THEO COLBORN, DIANE DUMANOSKI,
& JOHN PETERSON MYERS, OUR STOLEN FUTURE 38 (1996) (noting that, unlike cancer, birth
defects may be caused by very small, short term exposures to certain synthetic chemicals
during gestation). In addition, even scholars who are not philosophically opposed to the use
of risk assessment recognize its significant limitations. See, e.g., FARBER, supranote 19, at 163
(stating that "risk assessment is shrouded in uncertainty").
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C. Time
A third key attribute associated with environmental problems is
that they often unfold over long time periods. As a result, environmental
problems may be difficult or impossible to detect at their early stages of
development. Consider again, for example, the issue of stratospheric ozone
depletion resulting from the emission of certain chemicals including most
notably CFCs.' Although CFCs were first discovered in 1928 and produced
at steadily increasing rates through the mid-1970s, it was not until 1974 that
scientists began to suspect that CFCs (which persist over time) would
gradually make their way into the stratosphere.5 EPA promulgated
regulations banning the use of CFCs in a variety of applications soon after
scientists identified the problem.' Yet CFCs may persist in the environment
for decades or longer, and CFC production is a global phenomenon that has
taken place over a period of decades. Stratospheric ozone depletion will
therefore continue to be a problem for a considerable period.'
Issues of equity also frequently arise due to the fact that
environmental problems unfold over long time periods. It is necessary to
determine what value should be placed on future problems as compared to
present problems. In turn, a comparison must be made between future lives
and present lives. One option is to begin with intergenerational equity, the
notion that a future life has the same value as a present life.58 An alternative
is to discount the value of future lives. Discounting is premised on the idea
that the value of a future life is less than the value of a present life.' The
federal government uses discounting in its efforts to evaluate
environmental laws and regulations.' When discounting is used as a tool

54. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of CFCs.
55. See generally Mario J. Molina & F. Sherwood Rowland, Stratospheric Sinkfor
Chlorofluoromethanes:ChlorineAtomic Catalysed Destructionof Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974).
56. See 43 Fed. Reg. 11301 (Mar. 17, 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 11318 (Mar. 17, 1978). These
regulations were enacted pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1994).
57. Indeed, the ultimate consequences associated with CFCs already released is not yet
known. The effects of these releases on stratospheric ozone depend in part on such variables
as large volcanic eruptions (which, in addition to ice in the polar regions, could provide the
particles for the heterogeneous chemical reactions that destroy ozone). See KAREN LITRN,
OZONE DISCOURSES: SCIENCE AND POLITICS INGLOBALENVIRONMENTALCOOPERATION 52 (1994).
58. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 44 (rev. ed. 1999); EDrTH BROWN WEISS, IN
FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); see also WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON
FUTURE 43 (1987).
59. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Perilsof Precision, ENvTL. F., Sept. /Oct. 1998, at 38, 39.
60. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, DiscountingOur Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39
(1999) (describing current federal policy relative to discounting).
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to evaluate environmental laws and regulations, substantial variation may
exist due to the choice of discount rate.61
IV. POLITICAL CONTEXT
In addition to the ecological context, it is necessary to take into
account the political context in which EPA operates. By designing EPA to
be an independent federal agency in the initial reorganization that created
the agency, the Ash Council sought to minimize the impact of partisan
politics on EPA's activities. Nevertheless, EPA has been buffeted by
partisan winds at several points in its 30-year history. Therefore, the
political context in which the agency operates cannot be ignored. Any
effective organizational structure for EPA will incorporate tools to garner
the public legitimacy that can protect it in partisan storms.
A. Centralized Control
As Terry Moe notes, presidential control of EPA began even before
the creation of the agency and has continued to affect the agency's
effectiveness."2The range between benevolent and malicious control of EPA
has been relatively broad in the agency's history. Presidential and
administrative control could only be described as the latter during the
Reagan years. The scandal-plagued administration of Ann Gorsuch-Burford
and the manipulation of hazardous waste regulations for partisan purposes
have been well documented.'
Centralization of EPA makes the President's role exceedingly
important in environmental policymaking, and the President may reduce
the federal role in environmental protection efforts to provide relief to
regulated entities or the states. To insure their popularity with voters,
presidents take measures ostensibly aimed at stimulating the economy.
When this occurs, EPA may be portrayed as one of a number of obstacles
to economic growth that must be controlled. This was the crisis faced by the
agency in the Reagan Administration, a crisis all the more ironic for the
public's oft-detected support of environmental protection even when it is

61. See FARBER, supra note 19, at 88-90, 138-44.
62. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of BureaucraticStructure, in CAN THE GOvERNMENT
GOVERN? 267,322-23 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
63. See Steven A. Cohen, EPA: A Qualified Success, in CONTROVERSIES INENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 174, 190-93 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et al. eds., 1986); J.Clarence Davies, Environmental
Institutions and the Reagan Administration, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTHE 1980S: REAGAN'S
NEW AGENDA 143, 154-57 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1984); WALTER A.
ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND Poucy 232-33 (2d ed. 1991).
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M More recently, this was reflected in
in conflict with economic growth."
President George W. Bush's budget proposal for 2002.65
What is less well understood, however, is the tolerance of the public
for the inexact, science of making EPA responsive through presidential
elections." In the election of a single person, voters are unable to express
their specific desires about environmental policies. This leaves EPA without
steady political direction, and thus threatens the agency's support in the
public arena. Both the Reagan Administration and EPA were fortunate to
be able to turn to William Ruckleshaus to restore public confidence in the
agency in the wake of the Gorsuch-Burford scandal. But the agency's
reliance on the credibility of a single figure in its greatest moment of crisis
only underscores the tenuousness of its political position under centralized
control.
Whether centralized control of EPA is benevolent or malicious,
centralization of agency control creates information management and
priority-setting problems. As Dryzek and Lester point out, "[tihe
maintenance of central control can be costly in terms of the amount of
coercion required; centralized bureaucracies are insensitive to their errors,
and are unlikely to correct them; and they can easily lose touch with
changing conditions."' The sustainable communities approach to
environmental protection, recently identified as a growing trend, tries to
solve such fundamental problems with centralized management, especially
in the area of information needs and data management.'
Problems with information management occur in centralized
organizations because there assessing base-line measures of environmental
quality is difficult.69 Without a discrete jurisdictional unit in which to
measure ecosystem health, a centralized organization faces an information

64. Gallup Poll data show a solid majority of the American public supports environmental
protection even at the risk of curbing economic growth. See The Gallup Organization,
Americans Still Committed to Environmental Protection, but less concerned than last year, at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020422.asp (Apr. 22,2002).
65.

See OFFICE OF MGMT.& BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 228

(2001).
66. See Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICSAND PoLcy: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 63,106 (James P.Lester ed., 2d ed. 1995) (stating
that "the extent to which pro-environmental opinions are translated into political impacts is
unclear").

67. John S. Dryzek, & James P. Lester, Alternative Views of the EnvironmentalProblematic,
in ENVIRONMENTALPOLITICSANDPOLCY:THEORIESANDEVIDENCE 314,329 (James P. Lester ed.,

1989).
68. See TOWARD SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 3, at 26.
69. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA: PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH IMPROVED MANAGEMENT 82-111 (1988) [hereinafter GAO].
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overload, especially in the context of systems-oriented research7 ° A
centralized organization also "does not support the systematic exploration
of the view of field-level enforcement officials and legitimates a 'purist'
approach to regulation writing by 'specialists' cloistered in their
headquarters offices."' Communication is generally uni-directional in a
centralized organization.
Centralized control may also hinder priority setting. Risks
identified by EPA as the most pressing differ from the risks that EPA
spends the most money to control.' When the national office attempts to set
priorities among various risks, it is hindered by the magnitude of the task.
The result is that no single person or group really sets the priorities. Rather,
"the programs (and their support groups in Congress and elsewhere) set
"
the agendas, and the administrator resolves conflicts among programs. 3
B. Fragmentation
In 1963, Lynton K. Caldwell recognized the effects fragmentation
could have within the realm of environmental policy when he wrote, "It can
be demonstrated that many of the worst environmental errors are direct or
indirect results of segmental public decision-making, of failing to perceive
specific environmental situations in comprehensive environmental terms.'
This point has been echoed more recently.7' The organization of federal,
state, and local agencies continues to cause fragmentation in the realm of
environmental policy.7 6 Wetlands policy provides an illustrative example:
the Army Corps of Engineers has jurisdiction to review permit applications
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, with input from EPA and the Fish
and Wildlife Service;7 at the state level one or more agencies may have
authority to implement state authorized wetlands legislation as well as the

70. On data overload in systems-oriented assessments, see generally BRADEN ALLENBY,
INDUSTRIAL EcOLOGY: POLICY FRAMEWORK AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999).
71. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEMOF

REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 85 (1982).
72. See NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 25; ScI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 3,
at 13.
73. Jurgen Schmandt, Managing Comprehensive Rule Making: EPA's Plan for Integrated
Environmental Management, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 309,316 (1985).
74. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy?, 23 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 132, 138(1963).
75. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 5, at 7 ("A weakness in the current process for making
environmental policy is that problem definition, analysis, and decision making are
fragmented.").
76. See GAO, supra note 69, at 30.
77. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
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federally mandated Water Quality Certification program;' and locally both
non-zoning and zoning wetlands laws may exist (these local laws are often
implemented by separate entities).79 Other agencies may be involved
pursuant to a variety of statutory mandates if the wetlands are located
along a river or in a coastal area."
The problem of fragmentation also exists within EPA because the
agency is organized by medium (i.e., air, water, solid waste) and by
expertise (e.g., lawyers, administrators, and scientists).81 In cross-media
cases, information sharing and communication may play a vital role in
deciding the point at which it is best to intervene in the pollution cycle. Yet
organization along media lines makes it difficult to persuade program
managers to invest in cross-media projects, and program offices may
aggregate data in incompatible ways.82 Furthermore, single-media attempts
to control pollution may simply transfer the pollution to new media. 3
In the case of agency expertise, fragmentation causes a lack of
effective interdisciplinary coordination. For instance, attorneys in the
agency may not understand the difficulty faced by scientists in giving
conclusive answers as expert witnesses." Working more closely with
scientists on specific environmental issues could help attorneys use the

78. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). An example of state authorized wetlands legislation is the
Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act and its implementation regulations. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 131, § 40 (1998).
79. For example, in Massachusetts, local Conservation Commissions typically have
authority to implement local non-zoning wetlands bylaws or ordinances and local Planning
Boards have authority to implement zoning bylaws or ordinances that may include provisions
regulating wetlands.
80. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers may have jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994), or a state environmental agency may have
jurisdiction pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (1994).
81. See Daniel J. Fiorino, EnvironmentalPolicy as Learning:A New View of an Old Landscape,
61 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 322, 326 (2001) ("The fragmentation of policy strategies began with the
statutory framework and was reinforced by professional specialization, program organization
in the EPA and in the states, congressional oversight, and issue networks that grew up around
each problem."). This fragmented structure is a relic of the initial reorganization that created
EPA and was supposed to be phased out over time. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 5; Marcus,
supra note 8, at 276-77.
82. See GAO, supra note 69, at 196; see also Funke, supra note 7, at 138.
83. Consider, for example, the case of MTBE discussed above. See supra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text. Other examples include the creation of sludge as a byproduct of
wastewater treatment and the emission of air pollutants as a byproduct of municipal solid
waste incineration.
84. See Angus MacIntyre, Administrative Initiative and Theories of Implementation:Federal
Pesticide Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 205, 216 (Helen Ingram &
Kenneth Godwin eds., 1985).
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scientist's expertise more effectively in court. Conversely, scientists may
learn how to produce information that is directly useful for policymaking. 5
C. Litigation
The relative level of detail of federal legislation that provides EPA
with authority to implement environmental policies varies. In some cases,

legislation contains very vague language (e.g., the 1970 Clean Air Act). In
other cases, legislation written under the guidance of technical experts (e.g.,
the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act) contains extremely specific language.'
EPA must have administrative discretion to implement legislation because
of the attributes associated with environmental issues. 87 Yet legally
mandated activities dominate EPA's agenda and limit its flexibility,
especially when it is called to account in front of Congress or in the courts.'
Problems with legislative direction and uncertain science often
result in challenges to agency action both by environmental advocates and
industry.' The initiation of court proceedings reduces the flow of
information to the agency and is a time consuming and expensive process
that destroys cooperation between the agency, regulated entities, and the
public.9" Additionally, judges can act only when a litigant presents a case. 9'

Therefore, involvement by the courts in the process of policy formulation
and implementation is "sporadic, fragmented and episodic."92

85. Recognizing the degree of interconnection in natural ecosystems makes resolving
fragmentation in EPA appear even more critical. As one ecologist working on the pathbreaking Hubbard Brook research on ecosystems put it: "unless we stop addressing such
complex problems in a fragmented way, management actions will be piecemeal and often
ineffectual." GOLLEY, supra note 34, at 25.
86. Such legislation may be rendered obsolete by rapidly evolving scientific
understanding and environmental challenges.
87. See supra part III. Administrative discretion is necessary because environmental
problems cross boundaries, commonly are misunderstood due to scientific uncertainty, and
unfold over long periods of time. These attributes necessitate a flexible regulatory approach.
88. See Fiorino, supra note 7, at 86. Congress and the courts have actively limited EPA's
discretion in their respective oversight capacities. See RICHARDN.L. ANDREWS, MANAGINGOUR
ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES 239-42 (1999); Moe, supra note 62, at 318. Regarding the

activist posture taken by Congress in overseeing EPA, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, The
Neglected Question of CongressionalOversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodiet (Who Shall
Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 L. &CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1991).
89. A recent example is Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
See BARDACH &KAGAN, supra note 71, at 117-19.
91. See MELNICK, supra note 3, at 14.
92. Paul S. Weiland & Daniel S. Imber, Congress, the Courts and the InterstateTransport of
Solid Waste, 4 DICK. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 77, 86 (1994) (citing JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL
COMPULSIONS: How PUBuc LAW DISTORTS PuBLIc Poucy 6 (1989); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE
90.
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When they do act, courts frequently force EPA to reprogram. 3
Funds and personnel are transferred between offices to comply with court
ordered action, and especially to meet deadlines. As Rosemary O'Leary
writes, "From a 'macro' or agency-wide perspective, compliance with court
orders has become one of the agency's top priorities, at times overtaking
congressional mandates."" She has clarified a number of consequences of
judicial oversight, including reduced discretion and autonomy for EPA
officials. Courts have also harmed EPA by compelling it to seek less popular
policy options, using deadlines and other means to force the agency's
agenda. 5
Drawbacks to litigation have forced EPA to search for different
means of settling policy disputes. One study revealed a closed-door process
of bargaining in a tripartite arrangement involving EPA, environmental
interests, and regulated interests. 96 Another study shows the prevalence of
a negotiated-compliance model in water policy enforcement despite official
program literature that stresses consistent standard operating procedures.97
EPA works hard to minimize conflicts between values when
constructing environmental policy. Bargaining begins internally at the
earliest level of policy formulation as the program officials, the lead officials
on policy formulation, work to create a policy that is consonant with the
expectations of the national office. Program employees, for example, have
referred to the Economic Analysis Division (EAD) (a national office that
reviews policy) as the "in-house Office of Budget and Management."9 In
this way, bargaining becomes part of agency culture and shapes
policymaking.

SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 61 (1968)).

93. Two types of reprogramming are common. Reprogramming may be specific to the
relevant programmatic area addressed in a case. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train,
8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976.). It may be cross-programmatic. See, e.g., Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
94.

ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA 168

(1993).
95. See ALFRED MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING AN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 157-59 (1980).
96. See, e.g., Daniel J.Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation asa Policy Process,48 PUB. ADMIN. REV.

764 (1988).
97. See generally Susan Hunter & Richard W. Waterman, Determining an Agency's
Regulatory Style: How Does the EPA Water Office Enforce the Law?, 45 W. POL. Q. 403 (1992).
98. Mary Ellen Mogee, Risk Assessment in the Regulatory Process: Rule Making in the
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 185, 191
(Helen M. Ingram & R. Kenneth Godwin eds., 1985).
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Although bargaining may be a useful tool for limiting litigation,"
it does not help EPA garner public support because it fails to inform or
assess the public's environmental values. In negotiation, values may be
sublimated because agreement is the only test of the new rule.1" Without
a public accounting of tough value-based questions, EPA has at times
shirked an important duty, civic education. 0 1 It is difficult to develop an
ecological ethic conducive to public support if the agency fails to educate.
Finally, bargaining fails to assess a wide scope of public values since only

groups powerful enough to mount court challenges are included in the
process. Once in negotiation, community groups may be1 2"taken to the
cleaners" by groups better able to afford experts and data. 1
V. TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

To identify the organizational structure best suited to EPA, it is
useful to first explore the key differences among contrasting types of
bureaucracy. Following Max Weber, the earliest concepts of bureaucracy
involved the careful attribution of individual discretion to centralized

authority. 3 It was believed that a carefully defined operating procedure
combined with a clear chain of command could produce effective and quick
action. This highly mechanized view has been replaced with a more human
approach that recognizes the importance of informal organization. As the
complexity of the world increases, it is evident that "bureaucracy with its
nicely defined chain of command, its rules, and its rigidities is ill-adapted

99. Many commentators and scholars have extolled the virtues of mediation or alternative
dispute resolution. See, e.g., Cynthia Croce, Negotiation Instead of Confrontation,EPA J., Apr.
1985, at 23; Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Mediation: An Alternative Approach to Policy
Stalemates, 15 POL'Y Sci. 345 (1983). But see Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford,
Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing Environmentaland OccupationalHealth and
Safety Policy, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 141 (1999) (finding that negotiation does not necessarily
result in improved environmental outcomes); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (finding that
negotiation does not significantly reduce the likelihood of litigation).
100. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERAuSM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRIsIs OF
PuBuc AuToRrry 125-27 (1st ed. 1969).
101. See LANDY ET AL., supra note 6,at 279. Accord Caldart & Ashford, supra note 99, at 202
(concluding that when negotiation is used to formulate and implement policy, "the relative
bargaining power of the stakeholders largely determines the outcome, unless it is checked at
the end of the process by a government agency with a strong sense of trusteeship for the
congressional policy it is charged with implementing").
102. Douglas Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 211, 222-23 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1st
ed. 1990).
103. See generally FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS INSOCIOLOGY (H. Gerth &C. Wright Mills eds.,
1946).
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to the rapid change the (organizational) environment now demands."" 4
Informal groups arise as individual bureaucrats attempt to fill the gap
between formal organization and a rapidly changing world. Increasingly,
the manager's role is to coordinate such informal groups within an
"adaptive structure."
Previous work on bureaucratic structure suggests a typology of
bureaucracy that may be usefully suited to the discussion of EPA's
organizational attributes. Table 1 distinguishes between programmatic and
adaptable structures."05
In this typology, a programmatic structure is run primarily from
the top down. Decisions are made by a central authority, and instructions
are then passed on to "front-line" bureaucrats, such as in the military. Many
programmatic structures contain the right of appeal described by Max
Weber: if the orders seem unjust in a particular situation, those affected may
appeal to the top. Yet, in programmatic structures, decisions are not only
appealed to the top, they also originate there. Lastly, programmatic
structures tend toward specialization. As orders are passed down from the
top, they are assigned to units subdivided by function. Differing units are
often insensitive to overlapping responsibilities as each sector strives to
carry out its own orders.
Adaptable structures are the opposite of programmatic
bureaucracies. They are run primarily from the bottom up, granting
maximum flexibility to "street-level" bureaucrats."° Specific policies
formulated in adaptable structures may be widely disparate, depending
upon differing geographic, scientific, and political contexts. Adaptable
structures also provide for flexibility in setting priorities and incorporating
learning from the field. Unlike programmatic structures, adaptable
structures integrate their functions toward a set of common, albeit broad,
goals."n' The decentralized nature of adaptable structures makes this
possible by allowing for comprehensive (i.e., integrated) environmental
management in a limited geographic area.

104. William Scott, OrganizationTheory: An Overview and Appraisal, in READINGS INPUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 188 (Felix A. Nigro & Loyd G. Nigro eds., 1983).

105.

See Paul Berman, Thinking about Programmedand Adaptive Implementation: Matching

Strategiesto Situations,in WHY POLICIES SUCCEEDOR FAIL 205,205-13 (Helen M. Ingram & Dean

E. Mann eds., 1980). A similar typology of bureaucracies has been proposed to distinguish
structures that promote public participation from structures designed for efficiency. Regarding
this typology, see DOUGLAS YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY
AND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1982).

106. See Berman, supra note 105, at 211-12.
107. See id.
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In adaptable structures, managers must utilize multiple feedback
mechanisms to incorporate learning from the field. Whereas the flow of
information in programmatic structures is generally uni-directional from
the top down or bi-directional if well-developed feedback mechanisms
exist, information flow within adaptable structures is multi-dimensional.
Not only does information flow up and down the chain of command, it also
flows horizontally throughout the organization.
Although most bureaucracies, including EPA, present a mixture of
these two divergent types, an explicit recognition of operating conditions
suggests an emphasis of one structure over the other. EPA is not in a
position to operate with a programmatic bureaucracy because it lacks
explicit and non-contradictory legislative direction and faces continual
changes in both problems and solutions. The bureaucracy of EPA must be
adaptable if the agency is to pursue its mission successfully.
A number of elements of the environmental problematique compel
EPA to consider an adaptable structure. The first element concerns the
geographical disparity of environmental problems and ecosystem
features."° It is difficult for one central bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., or
even the existing regional structure of EPA to dictate a single set of
priorities for environmental protection. In part, demographic variation
influences the problems posed and possible solutions. Environmental
problems and opportunities for solutions also vary greatly by the industrial
sector and the type of infrastructure available in a given place.1°9 Different
types of ecosystems also require varying amounts and kinds of regulation.
Second, as described above, the scope of environmental regulation
is large and highly uncertain."' At times, there seems to be no limit to the
sources of natural and synthetic substances that can wreak havoc within the
earth's environment. The ecosystem that supports life is complex and
interrelated. As we discover more about the complexity of ecosystems,
regulations must encompass a greater diversity of sources, including
individual behavior. The state of control technology is also highly uncertain.
EPA must be able to adapt regulations as new technologies emerge and
create strategies that drive the development of clean technologies.

108. This element may also be described in terms of boundaries. See supra part II1.A.
109. See, for example, Bechtel Corporation's report on their Industrial Materials Exchange
(IME) model, where they studied firms in Brownsville, Texas, and developed a complex model
linking major industrial sectors so that wastes from some firms become feedstocks for others.
See Bechtel Corp., Texas Engineering Extension Service & The University of Texas at Austin,
Final Report: Brownsville/Matamoros Regional Industrial Symbiosis Project. Phase I:
Development of Technically Feasible Exchange Scenarios; see also generallyALLENBY, supra note
70.
110. On uncertainty, see supra part III.B.
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Time is the third element that compels EPA to consider an
adaptable structure,"' Humankind's understanding of environmental
processes and human-environment relations is incomplete and constantly
changing with new research. EPA must be organized in a manner that
allows the agency to continually evaluate policies and regulations and
adjust them in response to scientific advances.
The fourth element concerns EPA's need to maintain public
support. As a regulatory agency, EPA is caught in a bind. Environmental
regulation often imposes immediate and harsh sanctions on a few in order
to benefit the long-term and general interests of many. An adaptable
structure can help to foster a dialogue with the public, allowing EPA to both
gauge environmental values and act as a "civic-educator."'
VI. ESTABLISHING ADAPTABLE AGENCY
At EPA's creation, the Ash Council made an explicit call for a crossmedia approach to environmental protection in the new agency. 3 As the
agency's priorities and regulations issued through the years amply
demonstrate, it is an objective that has never been met fully. In 1993, with
the idea of ecosystem management gaining greater prominence, EPA once
again sought to address this issue.' Yet this time EPA was called upon to
adapt its priorities and regulations to an even broader set of concerns,
including biodiversity and other natural resource issues (for example, the
"Edgewater Consensus," see infra).
Despite periodic calls and renewed efforts for greater integration
of policymaking at EPA, the agency has never succeeded entirely in
meeting the challenge. Each time the agency moves toward greater
integration, the demands and incentives that derive from the agency's
programmatic structure eventually overwhelm the effort. Adopting the ecoregion as a new jurisdictional unit to replace the current regional structure
within EPA can help the agency move towards a more adaptable structure,
finally providing institutional inertia for integrated policymaking.

111. Regarding time, see supra part III.C.
112. See LANDY EE AL., supra note 6 at 7-8.
113. See Alfred A. Marcus, EPA's Organizational Structure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1991, at 5, 18.
114. Confidential Telephone Interview with EPA Official and Internal EPA Documents
(Nov. 8,2000) [hereinafter Interview].
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A. Defining Eco-Regions

To understand the idea of eco-regions, it is useful to distinguish it
from the concept of the bioregion. 15 This term precedes the notion of an
eco-region and emerged from a movement known as bioregionalism, 1a6
distinct branch of the broader radical environmental movement.

Bioregionalism envisions a community of people who know and live within
the ecology, potential, and limits of a given region. Bioregions are made up
of characteristics like river basins, valleys, mountain ranges, air sheds,

watersheds, as well as floral and faunal traits." 7 Because of a shared
understanding about the importance of living within the limits of these
elements, human behavior, development, and economic enterprises are
adapted to the traits of each bioregion.11 '
In bioregionalism, like much of the radical environmental
movement, the ideal of a pure, untouched nature is seen as the touchstone
for circumscribing human activity. 19 The prescriptive ideal in
bioregionalism imagines that intact biological entities may be defined prior
to human involvement, and then may be used to "contain" people and their
activities. 2 ° Thus, bioregionalism would seek to reduce radically the import

and export of natural resources or goods among bioregions, as well as to
stem the migration of humans between such areas. Concerns surrounding
economic stagnation and xenophobia are both important criticisms of
12
bioregionalism.

115. Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA's general counsel for three years during the Clinton
Administration, has been talking about building institutions for environmental protection
around bioregions. See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Cannon, The West Tower Philosopher, 15 ENVTL. F. 35
(1998). As is clear below, we believe the concept deserves careful examination and that it is
important to distinguish the idea of the "eco-region."
116. Jonathan Olsen, The Perils of Rootedness: On Bioregionalism and Right Wing Ecology in
Germany, 19 LANDSCAPE J. 73,73 (2000).
117. Regarding the bio-regional movement in general, see KnPATRICKSALE, DWELLERS IN
THE LAND: THE BIOREGIONAL VISION (1985).
118. Regarding the bio-regional vision in general, see HOME! A BIOREGIONAL READER (Van
Andruss ed., 1990).

119.

For a criticism of the wilderness ideal from an historical vantage point, see WILUAM

CRONON, UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE (1995).

120. See Terence Young, Belonging notContaining:The Vision ofBioregionalism,19 LANDSCAPE
J. 46 (2000).
121. See Olsen, supra note 116, at 76; Young, supra note 120, at 48. Taken to an extreme,
bioregionalism could result in economic protectionism. The resulting barriers to free trade
could reduce the flow of goods and services into and out of regions and, thereby, cause
economic stagnation. Likewise, an extreme form of bioregionalism may be accompanied by
antagonism toward minority groups within the region or (more likely) groups foreign to the
region.
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While the idea of bioregions puts humans in second place, the
concept of an eco-region seeks to blend a respect for natural features of the
land with an understanding of how humans already live with natural
systems in terms of economic production and cultural identification."2
Thus, eco-regions may be defined with reference to the relative density of
overlapping natural and social characteristics. They will rarely follow
traditional political boundaries, and even may not be of uniform size.
Rather than just a set of biophysical systems, they will be places that people
relate to.123
The notion of restructuring EPA along the lines of newly defined
eco-regions is closely akin to the concept of ecosystem management. In the
Clinton Administration, the Department of the Interior used ecosystem
management with some success in an attempt to resolve protracted and
bitter disputes over federal lands and endangered species.124 Ecosystem
management incorporates both humans and nature, rejecting definitions of
ecosystems that treat man as external to the environment. 125 As human
cultural factors play a role in defining eco-regions, the concept is even more
fluid than the already scientifically contested idea of the bioregion.
Natural criteria, derived from scientific investigation, are key to
defining a bioregion or an eco-region. Government agencies have made
numerous efforts to define eco-regions.
* As part of their effort to adopt an ecosystem management
approach, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service divided the United
States into 53 eco-regions based in large part on U.S. Geological

122. See Ortwin Renn, A RegionalConcept of QualitativeGrowth and Sustainability,in Report
of the Akademie fuer Technikfolgenabschaetzung in Baden-Wuerttemberg Germany 13-14

(1995).
123. See Young, supra note 120, at 49.
124. Cortner and Moote define ecosystem management with four criteria: (1) socially
defined goals and objectives, (2) holistic and integrated science, (3) adaptive management, and
(4) collaborative decision making. HANNA J. CORTNER & MARGARET A. MOOTE, THE POLITICS
OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 40 (1999). The concept moves away from the idea of maximum
sustained yield that was prevalent in early, machine-like depictions of ecosystems. See GOLLEY,
supra note 34, at 24. It also encompasses humans in the most common definition of ecosystems,
"a distinct and coherent ecological community of organisms and the physical environment in
which they interact." See D. Scott Slocombe, Implementing Ecosystem-Based Management:
Development of Theory, Practice,and Research for Managing a Region, 43 BIOSCIENCE 612, 612
(1993). In Renn's terms, the focus is on the long-term resilience of anthropogenic ecosystems,
in order that ecosystems will maintain productivity through disease and climate variability.
See Renn, supra note 122, at 16.
125. See CORTNER&MOOTE, supranote 124, at 37-45. Accord David T. Cleland et al., National
HierarchicalFramework of Ecological Units, in ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE FOREST AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES 181 (M. S. Boyce & A. Haney eds., 1997).
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Survey data regarding watersheds.126 Teams of professionals
were developed within each eco-region to improve resource
management and protection.127

" As early as 1976, the U.S. Forest Service developed a general
description of the ecosystem geography of the United States. 128
During the 1990s, the Forest Service developed a national
hierarchical framework of ecological units as part of its effort to
implement ecosystem management. 129 Forest Service personnel
completed studies that identify and describe eco-regions and
ecological subregions of the United States.13
" In short-term experimental research demonstrating the ecoregion concept, EPA's Corvallis laboratory divided the U.S. into
76 "eco-regions"
that were then used to aggregate ecosystem
1 31
data.
" In 1992, the California EPA also proposed using eco-regions to
permit process, locating seven logical regions in the
ease the
32
state.1
In addition, working at global scales, biogeographers have established
comparable types of eco-regions resulting from the interaction of
temperature, precipitation, soil types, vegetation, and fauna. 33 These past
efforts demonstrate the feasibility of identifying eco-regions.

126.

See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE

CONSERVATION § 1.6(A)(3) (Apr. 19, 1996).
127. See id. § 1.7(A).
128. See ROBERT G. BAILEY, DESCRIPTION OF THE ECOREGIONSOF THE UNITED STATES i (1995);
JAMES R. MAXWELL ET AL., A HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK OF AQUATIC ECOLOGICAL UNITS IN
NORTH AMERICA (NEARCTIC ZONE) 1 (1995).
129. See generally ROBERT G. BAILEY ET AL., ECOREGIONS AND SUBREGIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1994).

130. See generally id. HENRY MCNAB & PETER E. AVERS, ECOLOGICAL SUBREGIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1994).
131. See GAO, supra note 69, at 91.
132. California has also adopted a bioregional approach for the purposes of protecting
biodiversity under its landmark 1991 Natural Communities Conservation Planning Act
(NCCP), CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800-2840(West 1991). The state has located nine logical
"bioregions" for planning to protect biodiversity.
133.

See ROBERT G. BAILEY, ECOREGIONS: THE ECOSYSTEM GEOGRAPHY OF THE OCEANS AND

CONTINENTS 5, 48 (1997). Bailey adopts a definition rooted only in natural criteria, writing,
"Any large portion of the Earth's surface over which ecosystems have characteristics in
common is called an ecosystem region, or ecoregion." Id. at 2. Accord DAVID M. OLSON Er AL.,
FRESHWATER ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA: A CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT (1999); DAVID M.
OLSON ET AL., TERRESTRIAL ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA: A CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT

(1999).
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As important as natural criteria are, however, they are hardly
unambiguous." There are at least three basic natural features that must be
considered, including watersheds, geomorphology, and shifts in biotic
characteristics. Biotic characteristics can rarely be demarcated with
precision, but rather elide from the predominance of one to another.
Watersheds often overlap one to another with increasing scale, and
geomorphology may not correspond directly to either. 35 When social
systems and human cultural factors are added, the complexity increases
significantly.
Clearly, scientific and technical expertise cannot by themselves
determine eco-regional boundaries. Since a major reason for reorganizing
along eco-regional boundaries is to bolster public support for EPA, the
agency would be served best by using an inclusive stakeholder process to
choose among the possibilities identified by scientists. This would increase
the public's sense of citizenship in and stewardship for the biotic
community EPA is working to protect."3 Once natural and social scientists
had identified sets of overlapping functional relationships in watersheds,
airsheds, and industrial sectors, consulting with citizens and stakeholders
would let vernacular feelings for places and biota specify boundaries137
B. Advantages to Reorganizing by Eco-Region
Restructuring the agency by eco-regions would provide the
opportunity to finally overcome the difficulties of fragmentation through
integrated ecosystem management. The major goals of environmental
protection, including improved public health, economic well-being, and
intrinsic ecological values are all related to the understanding and
protection of ecosystems. An understanding of ecosystem dynamics that

134. As Terence Young writes, "the literature contains many contradictory suggestions on
how to identify a bioregion; how many there are; and where they are located. Settling these
contradictions remains a central challenge for bioregionalism." Young, supra note 120, at 48.

135. See Byron Taylor, Bioregionalism:An Ethics of Loyalty to Place, 19 LANDSCAPE J.50,61
(2000).
136. This can be seen in EPA's Community-Based Environmental Protection (CBEP)
program where the citizens initiate agency action around especially meaningful ecosystems
(e.g., Chesapeake Bay, etc.). Thus, the eco-region concept is able to retain at least some of the
biophilia that is central to bioregionalism. See Olsen, supra note 116, at 75.
137. In 1998, a research team published an assessment of the efforts of the Fish and Wildlife
Service to adopt an ecosystem approach including the establishment of eco-regions and
management teams within each region. See generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ECOSYSTEM
APPROACHTO FISH ANDWILDLIFECONSERVATION (1998). The team verified concerns about ecoregion boundaries but also concluded that the eco-regions established by the Fish and Wildlife
Service should be left intact. See id.
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reveals exposure paths and dose amounts is a prerequisite to the effective
use of risk assessment in protecting public health."
Eco-regions facilitate better collection and organization of ecological
information. In the Corvallis experiment, for example, standardized tests of
a range of organisms were developed to trace pollutants in the ecosystem.'
If the Corvallis approach were carried out across time, data could be
aggregated in each eco-region, providing a baseline for planning. Such data
would permit the agency to evaluate a program's effectiveness and track
emerging environmental problems. The eco-region could also enhance the
efficiency of research since it increases contact between decision makers and
researchers, drawing together the data of a number of governmental and
non-governmental units.
Although integration in the eco-region would provide a more
comprehensive picture of the ecosystem, many scientific uncertainties
would remain. An important virtue of the eco-region is that it would
facilitate bureaucratic learning in a trial and error or "incremental"
process. 4 ° Dean Mann has defined bureaucratic learning as "the process of
reducing uncertainty of all kinds: scientific; economic; administrative; and
political."' He asserts that "the only way one can plan for this is to design
management systems that can learn from trial and error."4
The eco-region may promote such learning by adapting
information and communication for the various ecological and scientific
contexts in which EPA operates. Sharing information across media and
industry sectors may speed the learning process and assist those attempting
to avoid pitfalls that others have already faced. The efficiency with which
knowledge is transferred throughout EPA largely determines the capacity
for bureaucratic learning.
Efforts to promote ecosystem management in the Great Lakes
region have been enhanced by the use of the Great Lakes Information
Network (GLIN) developed by governmental and non-governmental
organizations (including EPA). 43 GLIN provides people throughout the
Great Lakes region with information through the Internet. One way GLIN

138.

See Sci. ADVISORY BD., supranote 3, at 18.

139. See GAO, supra note 69, at 91
140.

This is a hallmark of adaptive management. See KAI LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE:

INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (1993); REPORT OF THE
INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY
ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES VOLUME I-OVERVIEW 51 (1995).

141. Dean Mann, EnvironmentalLearningin a DecentralizedPoliticalWorld, 44J. INTL AFFAIRS
301,336 (1991).
142. Id.
143. For information about GLIN, see GLIN homepage, athttp://www.great-lakes.net (last
visited Apr. 5, 2002).
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has been used is as a forum for coordinators of remedial action plans
throughout the Great Lakes region who often face the same types of
challenges as they attempt to clean up specific areas of concern within the
region. The use of technology in conjunction with a new eco-regional
structure may result in efficient communication and more effective learning.
EPA officials in each eco-region could fine tune policies as
uncertainty is reduced and make adaptable changes in bureaucratic
structures to confront emerging problems. Within eco-regions, working
groups might be prioritized for specific chemical pollutants, industrial
sectors,'" habitat conservation initiatives, and sustainable community
goals. 5 Other principles for organizing working-groups might be
discovered to meet specific goals in each eco-region.
An eco-regional approach to toxic pollution would involve a careful
materials balance (including exposure and dose for a priority chemical) and
a review of regulatory options. While using quantitative risk assessment to
help define priorities is often promoted, it is only feasible with much more
highly developed data than we currently have.1" Working groups on toxic
pollution could develop and compile such data in partnership with state
officials and university researchers.
Another working group might use an industrial sector approach,
in which they would assess all the emissions from a particular industrial
sector that predominated in the region." When EPA Region I was
reorganized along cross-media principles, the agency was able to target
specific sectors, reducing delays and increasing pollution prevention
technical assistance.'" Strategic plans mixing current and potential

144. See generally Daniel J.Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The
Casefor an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457 (1996).
145.

See generally TOWARDSUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: TRANSrTON AND TRANSFORMATION

INENVIRONMENTAL POLCY, supranote 3 (describing the broad range of measures and goals in
the emerging movement for sustainable communities, including community goals such as
reduced commuting time, lower energy use, and watershed restoration).
146. See generally Walter A. Rosenbaum, The EPA at Risk: Conflicts over Institutional
Reform, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTHE 1990S 143 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds.,
3d ed. 1997) (summarizing the many calls for the use of comparative risk assessment in setting
priorities at EPA). The need for more and better data is particularly true from an
environmental justice perspective. See Roe & Pease, supra note 39, at 24 (pointing out that we
lack adequate data on the exposure levels of different segments of the public, and on
interaction with existing health problems).
147. See Schmandt, supra note 73, at 313.
148. JODI PERRAS, REINVENTING EPA NEW ENGLAND: AN EPA REGIONAL OFFICE TESTS
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8-11 (2000).
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regulatory and non-regulatory tools could be developed for priority
sectors. 49

Using eco-regions might also help the agency prioritize its
activities. Although EPA has substantial budgetary re-programming
authority, studies of the national office have shown that re-programming
was rarely used in the past. When used, re-programming tended to operate
against agency-defined priorities." If re-programming authority were
decentralized to eco-regions, there would be a more manageable set of
issues from which to choose priorities."5 ' Agency experts in charge of
monitoring and information in each eco-region could help administrators
shift funding towards priority problems.
The use of working groups within eco-regions could help to target
staff and resources more flexibly and efficiently. If strong enforcement is the
best path forward, a particular working group might have more attorneys.
In contrast, a working group providing technical assistance might have only
engineers or industry specialists. Yet a third group might be composed
primarily of scientists seeking a better understanding of some aspect of the
region's ecology.
One problem often noted in recruiting and retaining excellent
employees at EPA is the limited opportunities for career advancement,
especially for agency scientists. The decentralization of leadership that
would occur in reorganization by eco-regions would make the agency more
adaptable and open up new management positions. 52 Many of these might
be well suited to agency scientists since working groups would be
grounded in scientific and legal goals."s
Eco-regions might also make flexible enforcement programs like
emissions trading or offsets more feasible. One barrier to such enforcement
programs is the difficulty of specifying trading regions." The eco-region

149. STEVEN COHEN & SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION THROUGH
STRATEGIC PLANNING (1991).
150. See GAO, supra note 69, at 73.

151. Perras found that when EPA reorganized Region I in the mid-1990s, the new Office
of Ecosystem Protection was better able to target federal resources by taking a watershed
approach to the Charles River. See PERRAS, supra note 148, at 26-30. Although EPA was
constrained by basic legal requirements from completely abandoning the point source permit
system, the agency did target a greater share of resources at priority, non-point source
pollutants.
152. See CORTNER&MOOTE, supra note 124, at 65 (explaining that decentralized leadership
was a major advantage in ecosystem management at the Department of the Interior).
153. If EPA were to develop technical information on the basis of the new eco-regions, as
suggested above, there would be leadership positions for scientists to direct the new
environmental information systems, working in partnership with universities, state agencies,
and local governments.
154. See generally BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 71.
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would diminish this problem by providing a jurisdiction, roughly bounded
for the dispersion of many common pollutants, in which to implement such
programs. This would extend the bubble concept, which treats a collection
of pollution sources as one entity for regulatory purposes.155 This method
can reduce pollution at the most efficient points of the process. Savings
from well-designed flexible enforcement programs have been extensively
documentedlM
Whether or not market mechanisms are chosen, flexible
enforcement could be accomplished by assessing individual requests for
variation in the context of the environmental goals of the eco-region. When
considering legal settlements by consent decree, the agency might be able
to better target cleanup goals and settlement funds. For example, local
governments in violation of their water treatment permits might spend
some portion of settlement funds to restore and protect wetlands as well as
on treatment plant construction. Restoring wetlands would both improve
water quality and provide crucial habitat. Understanding the ecosystem
goals could the lead EPA toward a settlement with greater net
environmental benefits.
No doubt the move toward flexible enforcement in the eco-region
would be a significant shift in the culture of EPA. It would mean measuring
successful performance not by the number of enforcement actions, but by
ecological results. These sorts of measures are subtle and long-term, and the
media are less accustomed to reporting them. 7 However, new
performance-based measurements should be easier to gather at the smaller
scale of the eco-region. EPA officials in each eco-region would need to learn
creative ways to communicate these to the public.
Eco-regions might also foster greater public participation in policy
decisions. It is nearly axiomatic that a reduced scale of decision making
enhances the participation of citizens. Since eco-regions are closely matched
to ecological resources, which are the formative basis of environmental

155. Regarding the bubble concept, see Tom H. Tietenberg, Economic Instrumentsfor
EnvironmentalRegulation, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 373, 375-76 (Robert N. Stavins
ed., 4th ed. 2000).
156. See, e.g., id. at 381-82.
157. Perras found that this created additional challenges for the reorganization of EPA's
Region I. See PERRAS, supranote 148, at 38-40. In this case, enforcement resources and programs
were distributed among several new multi-media offices. While traditional enforcement
activities dropped somewhat, the region targeted enforcement against the worst violators.
Record fines resulting from these actions drew visibility and lessened criticism of the agency
in the press. See id. at 38. Given EPA's tumultuous history under the Reagan Administration,
this type of reform may be more difficult under a Republican Presidential Administration.
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movements, participation might be amplified." When wider participation
occurs, the agency becomes better aware of each community's values and
aspirations.
Such increased awareness would help EPA to garner public
support. Of course, EPA is likely to be quite unpopular, especially with

certain stakeholders from time to time. This is in the nature of an agency
that imposes private costs for public benefit. While EPA must not shy away
from these controversial moves, reorganizing by eco-regions may help EPA

to choose its battles wisely, both from scientific and political perspectives.
C. Initiatives and Impediments at EPA
An important question is whether a less far-reaching proposal

might not do equally well to set EPA on the path to accomplishing its
mission. Although EPA has made tentative steps in the direction of greater
integration and adaptability, the organizational structure of the agency has
been a significant impediment to lasting change. Innovative programs

under the Community Based Environmental Protection approach, like the
Office of Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities (OSEC), have faced
outright cancellation. 59 Deeper organizational changes are required to
overcome the bureaucratic inertia in 30-year traditions of media programs
and top-down direction."W
Community Based Environmental Protection (CBEP) is an initiative
in place-based approaches to environmental protection at EPA.

61

As such,

it incorporates some of the elements of the regional, cross-media approach
identified above. 62 Because it is an approach and not a program office, it
158. See PERRAS, supra note 148, at 40-44 (finding that the Office of Ecosystem Protection
developed in the reorganization of Region I created strong partnerships between EPA and
other major policy actors because it was organized around protecting places that people
understood and to which they related).
159. See Interview, supra note 114.
160. Any proposal to change EPA's organizational structure will incite apprehension
within the agency. EPA's program offices, in particular, may be expected to resist proposals
for organizational change. The program offices have their own statutory support system and
are the most important operational units within the agency. See Rosenbaum, supra note 146,
at 154; see also Funke, supra note 7, at 138,150-51. Because apprehension regarding reform of
EPA's organizational structure is inevitable, the leadership of the President and the
Administrator is a prerequisite for such change. See PERRAS, supra note 148, at 18-20.
161. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA's FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 5 (1999).
162. The idea of using place-based partnerships emerged from the ecosystem management
concept that was taking shape in fisheries and forest management plans. Formative
interagency discussions included participants from EPA, NOAA, DOI, and USDA. Combining
pollution control technologies and better land-use management to reduce non-point source
water pollution were among the most immediate applications for CBEP. Therefore, watershed-
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has only one full-time staff person at headquarters. CBEP relies on
voluntary commitments from staff on permanent assignment in regional
and national program offices to collaborate for place-based environmental
protection.
The CBEP approach was first identified at EPA starting with
interagency discussions on ecosystem protection in late 1993 and was
established formally in 1994." In March of 1994, EPA developed the
"Edgewater Consensus," an internal memorandum that calls for work
across traditional media boundaries in "nationally significant" places (e.g.,
Everglades, Great Lakes, Chesapeake Bay). As a result of the Edgewater
consensus and internal discussions, EPA headquarters also established
OSEC by shifting resources within the Policy Office in 1995.1" In February
of 1999, OSEC was disbanded. This was due in large part to the departure
of influential and supportive staff at the agency. It was also related to
controversies over budgeting between OSEC and the national program
offices, and ultimately to EPA's organizational structure.
Another example of the struggle over budgeting is the fate of the
CBEP-Regional Geographic Initiative (RGI) Fund. In 1996, OSEC brokered
an agreement among four EPA media program offices, the RGL and the
EPA's regions to create the CBEP-RGI Fund." The fund was targeted to
support regional priorities for eliminating cross-media pollution. This effort
lasted only one year, investing just $2 million, split among all ten regional
offices of EPA.'" The national program offices declined to participate
beyond the first year because of concerns with the pilot projects, and the
desire to hold the purse strings more closely at headquarters. Outcomes of
the projects under development were criticized for being more focused on
process than on results, and for an inadequate focus on statutory goals.
Although the effort did result in greater public participation in traditional,
programmatic activities, the goal of true cross-media regulation was not
met.
Early in its implementation, the 1993 Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) seemed to be supportive of CBEP.'67 This law
compelled the agency to set goals that are closely tied to the statutory
framework of the agency's enabling legislation. By connecting CBEP to
goal-setting under discretionary funding, a goal was set for EPA to establish
partnerships for sustainable development in 50 places by 2005 (Goal 8 (6-2)).
level permitting to achieve goals under the Clean Water Act was a central component from the
start. See Interview, supra note 114.
163. See Interview, supra note 114.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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This ambitious goal dearly required significant additional resources, and
20 percent of budgets in the five national media programs were earmarked
in 1996 for collaboration and cross-media work.
Under this initiative, several important sustainability partnerships
between EPA and local stakeholders began during OSEC's existence. One
of these was a three-year project in South Florida, where funds of
approximately $1 million were used to conduct community meetings, map
infrastructure, and set sustainable development goals." This program was
also part of the RGI and was directed primarily at reducing sprawl into the
Everglades by promoting infill development in the inner city, especially on
urban brownfields.
But the GPRA turned out to be another impediment to moving
toward place-based approaches. OSEC's initiative to motivate the national
program offices to use place-based approaches cut against other goals that
the assistant administrators are under pressure to deliver under the GPRA.
The assistant administrators viewed these programmatic goals as priorities.
Tied to the enabling legislation of each office, these goals involve basic
command and control functions like the number of rules published, the
number of permits issued, the number of enforcement actions taken, or the
number of outstanding liability claims settled. The tendency, even under
prodding from OSEC, was for program offices simply to recast existing
activity with added community involvement, rather than also redesigning
implementation along cross-media and ecosystem protection lines.
Powerful incentives from the GPRA drove the program offices in
this direction. Programmatic goals are especially amenable to one and two
year time frames, and thus fit closely with the desire to demonstrate
performance enhancement under the GPRA. In contrast, the desired
endpoints of sustainable development are not so easily depicted in short
time spans. Here, stochastic processes of species colonization and economic
development may frustrate efforts to measure results in less than five or ten
year increments.
The dismantling of OSEC and the elimination of Goal 8(6-2) is a
setback in the move toward an adaptable agency. Implementation of
regional approaches and sustainable development within EPA are impeded
by the agency's organizational structure. Even EPA regions are too
centralized relative to the geographical area that staff must cover. Thus,

EPA is not a main player in most ecologically significant places. Increased
institutional focus through reorganization by eco-region would likely
enhance resource commitments for multi-media, ecosystem-oriented, and
community driven projects.

168.

See id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

In spite of these setbacks, CBEP lives on at EPA, especially in the
regional offices. To a lesser degree, but much as might be expected in
reorganization by eco-regions, the varying ecological contexts of the current
regions have led to different CBEP strengths. Heavily urbanized regions, for
example, have found the CBEP approach works well for dealing with
multiple pathways and sources of toxic exposure and linking brownfields
redevelopment (infill) with the struggle against sprawl. Regions with
complex, overlapping biomes have found CBEP is a way to support the
application of GIS technologies and landscape ecology views.
At various times, the connection of EPA's structure to the legal
framework of its enabling legislation, the vicissitudes of budgeting, and the
goals set under the GPRA, have impeded change. Some of these proximate
factors impeding change are more susceptible to executive action than
others,1" but agency leadership may be able to use reorganization as an
ultimate causal factor to push change forward. For example, the new ecoregions could be vested with GPRA goals--especially long-term ecosystem
protection goals. Congress and the courts might then react quite differently
to the agency, pushing forward adjustments in its legal framework over the
long term.
D. Striking a Balance: National and Eco-Region Roles
Often proposals to improve bureaucratic performance that involve
the integration and decentralization of decision making lack the "checks
and balances" of republican government." ° But the shift towards an
adaptable bureaucracy depicted here would retain several important checks
on the authority of the eco-region, including the congressional and judicial
oversight, state and local governments, and the national office. In an
adaptable EPA, the staffing levels and roles of the national office would be
reduced and corresponding increases would occur in the new regions, but
functions would still be divided between the national and eco-region
offices. While the adaptability of the eco-region is generally more effective
in meeting the agency's mission, a programmatic bureaucracy-and thus
the national office-may be more appropriate to accomplish certain
functions.
Transboundary environmental problems, such as global warming,
stratospheric ozone depletion, oceans and fisheries management, and acid

169. Of course, budgeting is the factor least susceptible to executive action. It is worth
pointing out here that reorganization is made more difficult by fiscal austerity. See PERRAS,
supra note 148, at 19-20. Reorganization is likely to have some up front costs. If it were done
as a budget cutting strategy, it would likely be a disaster for the agency.
170. See YATES, supra note 105, at 110.

Winter 20021

REFORMING EPA'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

127

precipitation, may be mitigated through actions taken at the local level.171

But coordination by a central authority may be critical to the success of
mitigation efforts."7 Individual eco-regions are part of a larger integrated

system.1" When sulfur dioxide from the Midwest's coal burning power
plants transforms into acid precipitation in the Northeast, the required
response must bridge eco-region boundaries. One function of EPA's
national office is to address such transboundary environmental problems.

A second, related function of the national office is to combat the
"not in my back yard" (NIMBY) problem. Too much devolution of
authority to the eco-regions could exacerbate the existing NIMBY problem.
The national office may monitor the flow of resources and pollutants across
eco-regions, particularly because the ability of the states to control the flow

is limited by the dormant Commerce Clause.174 When necessary, the
national office could compel communities to address environmental
problems by curtailing the flow of resources or pollutants. Such action

would provide an incentive to communities to manage resources and
pollutants carefully (e.g., through the adoption of waste reduction strategies
and development of safe transport, processing, and disposal of wastes),t
Third, the national office also will continue to play a critical role in

the area of information gathering, assessment, and dissemination. Although
much data gathering and analysis is best done at the eco-regional level, the
national office may facilitate such efforts. Furthermore, the national office
could create a centralized pool of information that would allow for

171.

Regarding boundary problems in environmental law and policy, see supra Section III

A.
172. Transboundary problems are, necessarily, collective action problems. Regarding such
problems, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); H. Scott Gordon,
The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcON. 124 (1954).
Whether such problems require a centralized response or simply coordination among
decentralized entities is the subject of scholarly debate. CompareGarrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) with ELINOROSTROM, GOVERNINGTHECOMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). Either as a central authority or as
a coordinator, EPA's national office has a role to play in the response to such problems.
173. For one interesting assessment of this integrated system, see JAMES LOVELOCK, GAA:
A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH (3d ed. 2000).
174. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994); City of Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Regarding solid waste
management and the dormant Commerce Clause, see Paul Weiland & Rosemary O'Leary,
Federalism and Environmental Policy: The Case of Solid Waste Management, 27 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 211,213 (1997).
175. See DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S TOXICs
POLICY FOR THE 1990S 191-204 (1992). Requiring communities to bear their fair share of the
burdens associated with environmental degradation increases the likelihood that no single
community will bear a disproportionate share. This is responsive to the concerns raised by
many in the environmental justice community.
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assessment of problems within and across eco-regions. By so doing, the
national office would facilitate learning by the regions, which could draw
upon the collective experiences of other regions. Some research and
development (e.g., related to pollution prevention and control technologies)
could remain in the national office to take advantage of economies of scale.
Other efforts at the eco-regional level could be monitored by the national
office to avoid duplication.
Fourth, the national office may address particularly difficult
environmental challenges that require a programmatic response. For
example, it may be appropriate to set nationwide uniform minimum
standards for highly toxic materials that pose serious risks such as
acceptable levels of lead in drinking water.176 It also may be necessary to
establish uniform maximum standards applicable to certain activities or
industries to create a uniform and predictable business environment."
E. State and Local Roles
The decentralization advocated in this article should not be
confused with the new federalism policy of former President Reagan and
his administration. It is distinct in a number of ways. Rather than making
EPA more adaptable, Reagan maintained the programmatic bureaucracy of
EPA in a smaller and relatively under-funded form (adjusting for inflation,
the agency budget was cut by more than one-third between 1981 and
1983).17 s What was proclaimed aboveboard as an attempt to bolster state
authority was actually a below-board attempt to scale back environmental
regulation indiscriminately, using the federal budget to accomplish the task.
Although adaptation to regional conditions and preferences is a laudable
aim, devolving programs to the state level will not have the same results.
State boundaries hardly match ecosystem boundaries, and spillover effects
between states can cause problems for interstate regulation." States and
localities also vary in the ability to handle the technical complexity of
environmental regulation."s Finally, as a range of scholars have concluded,

176. See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical
Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237,24142 (2000).
177. See id. at 242-43.
178. Norman J.Vig, PresidentialLeadership: From the Reagan to the Bush Administration,in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTHE 1990S 33,38 (Norman J.Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
179. See Esty, supra note 31, at 587-97.
180. Regarding varied state capacity, see Barry Rabe, Power to the States: The Promise and
Pitfallsof Decentralization,in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTHE 1990s 31, 40-42 (Norman J.Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed. 1997). On the need for increased capacity at the local level, see
Carol J. Cimitile, et al., Balancing Risk and Finance: The Challenge of Implementing Unfunded
EnvironmentalMandates, 57 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 63, 68-69 (1997); David L. Markell, Preliminary
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when states make policies alone, they are generally more in tune with
economic investment than with environmental protection. 8 '
Yet, if the broad and powerful goals mandated in federal legislation
are to be implemented, states and localities will have to play a role. The
control that local governments, in particular, exercise over land-use policy
is an important common denominator in a wide range of environmental
policies. State and local efforts may be focused most effectively on projects
that require their authority to achieve environmental goals.
Eco-regions would be able to cooperate closely with state and local
governments and foster cooperation among the jurisdictions in solving
regional problems. Jodi Perras reports that the geographically compact
nature of EPA's Region I facilitates contact between EPA and officials in
state and local governments."z The decentralized nature of reorganization
by eco-regions would promote such contact, which would in turn provide
the agency with information about environmental values in each
community.
A wide range of scholars acknowledges the political importance of
a strong federal role in environmental protection. Paul Peterson's city limits
theory suggests that localities and states have less political capacity than the
federal government to manage economic growth for environmental
protection." Although highly supportive of state and local roles, Dewitt
John is careful to note the limits of the "comparative advantages" that state
and local governments possess."' Denise Scheberle grounds her study of
relationships between federal and state program officials on the premise
that strong federal oversight and funding are key." Without federal
oversight, states would vary even more deeply than they already do in
commitment to various environmental programs. In the words of William
Ruckelshaus, the first EPA administrator, the agency must remain the
"federal gorilla in the [state's] closet."1 6
The reforms advocated here recognize the reality of this situation.
Rather than cede authority to the states, the goal of reorganizing by ecoregion is to decentralize the resources, power, and the national perspective

Thoughts on FuturePolicy Directionsfor the Managementof Solid and Hazardous Waste, 7 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 119,140 (1996).

181.

See Rabe, supra note 180, at 44.

182. See PERRAS, supranote 148, at 15.
183. See generally PAULE. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981).
184. See generally JOHN, supra note 3.
185. See DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL PoLICY: TRUST AND THE
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1997).

186. See id. at 8.
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of EPA on a regional basis." Ortwin Renn argues persuasively that
sustainable development can be operationalized most effectively over
regions." In the United States, there is a long-running historical failure of
state and local governments in making regional governance work) 89 Both
inside and across state borders, many experiments in regional government
have been short-lived or incomplete."9° Sustainable development likely
requires a strong federal role in making regional governance work.'91
VII. CONCLUSION
EPA is faced with an enormous legal mandate and expansive
mission. The agency's efforts to carry out its mandate and achieve its
mission are hampered by the geographic disparity of environmental
problems, uncertain science, and the scope of regulation (which is large and
ever changing). Furthermore, the political context in which EPA operates
and the budgetary pressures compound the challenge the agency faces. As
a result, EPA must inevitably choose priorities among elements of this
mandate and mission. Reorganization by eco-region would give EPA new
tools to make better decisions for both its own future and the environment.
Reorganization by eco-region would make EPA a more adaptable
organization. As such, EPA would be more likely to overcome
fragmentation, collect and analyze information, learn from mistakes using
principles of adaptive management, improve priority setting, adopt a
flexible approach to enforcement, and enhance public participation. The
success of such an approach is dependent on (1) the level of political
commitment to eco-regions within the Executive Office of the President and
EPA's appointed leaders and (2) the ability of EPA's professional staff to
187. Cortner and Moote report on the success of this formula in bringing better
management to federal lands. See CORTNER &MOOTE, supra note 124, at 99-105.
188. See Renn, supra note 122, at 24.
189. Attempts at regional governance in the modem United States may be traced back to
Lewis Mumford's efforts with the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) in the
1930s. The RPAA offered a vision of organic regions where culture would be maintained
through economic integration. Land-use plans would be cooperatively developed among state
and local governments to promote the economic interests of the region. However, structures
of regional governance have nearly always lacked the resources or authority to ameliorate the
self-interest of localities. See STEPHANIE S. PINcErL, TRANSFORMING CALIFORNIA: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT 134 (1999).

190. The air quality management districts in California are a partial success in terms of
regional government and demonstrate the value of federal power for bringing about regional
cooperation. However, these are medium-specific entities, not comprehensive regional
governments. See Mazmanian, Los Angeles' Transitionfrom Command-and-Controlto Market-Based
Clear Air PolicyStrategiesand Implementation, in TOWARD SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, supra note

3, at 77, 86.
191. See Rabe, supra note 180, at 42-43.
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recognize the value of the eco-region approach and use the discretion that
would accompany the eco-region approach to accomplish EPA's mission.

